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OF SECRETS AND SPIES: STRENGTHENING 
THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW ABOUT 
THEClA 
Martin E. Halstuk, Ph.D.* and Eric B. Easton, J.D.** 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Intelli!fence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (Intelligence Reform Act) in the aftermath of government investigations 
into the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The two principal investigations, 
conducted by the 9/11 Commission2 and a joint panel of the Senate and House 
intelligence committees,3 were harshly critical of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA or the Agency), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
Pentagon's intelligence services for failing to share and publicize crucial 
information concerning terrorist threats. In particular, the reports singled out 
• Martin E. Halstuk is Assistant Professor of Communications in the College of 
Communications at Pennsylvania State University, where he teaches mass media law. He is 
also Senior Fellow at the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment. Formerly, he 
worked as an editor at the Los Angeles Times and a reporter at the San Francisco Chronicle. 
•• Eric B. Easton is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of 
Law, where he teaches communications law. He is also a senior research associate at UB's 
Center for International and Comparative Law. He was formerly a professional journalist 
and is working toward a Ph.D. in Journalism at the University of Maryland. 
1. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
118 Stat. 3638-3872. 
2. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. The 
567-page 9/11 Commission report, released July 22, 2004, was prepared by a ten-member, 
nonpartisan panel headed by Thomas Kean, former governor of New Jersey. 
3. JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, REPORT OF THE U.S. SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 107-351 & H.R. REP. No. 107-792, (2002) [hereinafter SENATE 
AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT]. The nearly 900-page Senate and House joint report, 
prepared by a panel of the Senate and House intelligence committees, was released July 24, 
2003. 
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the CIA, "the lead agency confronting al-Qaeda,"4 for withholding vital 
information that could have averted a series of blunders and missteps in the 
critical weeks and months before the assault on New York City and 
Washington, D.C.5 
The 9/11 Commission Report revealed that for nearly two years before the 
attacks, the CIA had been aware of the al-Qaeda ties of two 9/11 hijackers who 
were living in San Diego,6 and the Agency had received reports of terrorist 
threats within the United States,7 including information that al-Qaeda had plans 
to hijack passenger planes and use them as weapons. 8 The Senate and House 
joint panel found that the CIA had enough information before the attacks to 
warrant defensive measures such as strengthening airport security; placing 
suspected terrorists on watch lists; coordinating investigation efforts between 
federal and state authorities; and, finally, alerting the American public to the 
serious nature of the threats.9 Both investigations concluded that the attacks 
might have been thwarted had the CIA disclosed some of its information about 
the activities of known and suspected al-Qaeda members. 10 
The impetus behind the Intelligence Reform Act was to prevent another 
terrorist attack on American soil. The statute completely overhauled the United 
States intelligence apparatus, largely by amending the National Security Act of 
1947, 11 which created the CIA and established the Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI) as its head. The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that 
by renovating the fifty-seven-year-old National Security Act to create a modern 
intelligence infrastructure, Congress has also paved the way for a new 
4. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 400. 
5. /d. at 353, 355-56, 400-03; SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 
3, at xi, xvii. 
6. See 9/l!COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 215-21; SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT 
COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 143-52. 
7. See 9/IICOMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 353-58; SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT 
COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 118. See also Dana Priest, White House, CIA Kept Key 
Portions of Report Classified, WASH. POST, July 25, 2003, at Al, A16; David Johnston, 
Word for Word/Revisiting 9/11; The Warnings Were There, But Who Was Listening? N.Y. 
TiMES, July 27, 2003, at AI. 
8. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 128-30 & 484 n.ll2 and SENATE 
AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 9. See also Walter Pincus & Dan 
Eggen, AI Qaeda Unchecked For Years, Panel Says; Tenet Concedes CIA Made Mistakes, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 15,2004, at AI, Al2. 
9. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at xv, 118. 
10. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 353, 355-56, 400-03; SENATE AND 
HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at xvii. The Senate and House joint inquiry 
found that "[s]ome significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data being 
collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at the time 
and therefore not disseminated .... [T]he Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize 
on available, and potentially important, information." SENATE AND HousE SELECT CoMM. 
REPORT, supra note 3, at xi. 
II. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343,61 Stat. 495-510 (1947). 
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intelligence-information paradigm. That paradigm can reduce what then-
Senator Bob Graham, former Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
and a conferee on the Intelligence Reform Act, characterized as the intelligence 
community's "dangerous obsession" with secrecy. 12 Certain features of the 
A 13 h . b d d' . . f . 11' . fi . 14 ct -an emp as1s on roa 1ssemmatton o mte 1gence m ormation, 
enhanced declassification ~rocedures, 15 and a recognition of civil liberties in 
the fight against terrorism 1 -have drawn into serious question the viability of 
Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 17 the 1985 Supreme Court decision that 
exempted the CIA from virtually any disclosure requirements under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 18 
For the last two decades, near-blanket CIA secrecy has gone largely 
unchecked, principally because of the Court's ruling in Sims, 19 which granted 
the DCI broad and unreviewable authority to protect intelligence sources and 
methods from unauthorized disclosure.20 Under the broad powers established in 
Sims, the CIA can sidestep strict classification procedures for withholding 
information21 and can also withhold unclassified and declassified information 
merely on an assertion that "intelligence sources and methods" could be 
compromised. Further, the Sims ruling permits the CIA to avoid de novo 
judicial review of CIA assertions that "intelligence sources and methods" are 
22 
actually at stake. 
The sweeping secrecy that the Sims Court has sanctioned effectively blocks 
public and press efforts to evaluate CIA performance, thus making 
accountability difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, the CIA's widely publicized 
failures in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks illustrate the folly of 
unchecked secrecy, which not only cloaks questionable Agency activities but 
also conceals grave problems in CIA management. These problems were 
further evidenced in the CIA's miscalculations and false assessments of Iraqi 
weapons strength, which were used to justify the American invasion oflraq?3 
Over the years, the Sims precedent has blocked access to CIA-held 
12. 150 CONG. REc. S11939-01, 12001 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004). 
13. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
118 Stat. at 3638-3872. 
14. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text. 
17. 471 U.S.159(1985). 
18. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (2005). 
19. 471 u.s. 159 
20. Id. at 168-70. 
21. Id. at 183-84 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
22. Id. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
23. REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. Rep. No. 108-301 (2004) 
[hereinafter PREWAR INTELLIGENCE REPORT]. 
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information in a long line of cases that cover a wide array of issues of public 
interest.24 In 2004, for example, the Supreme Court let stand a federal appellate 
court decision that cited Sims repeatedly in its rationale to allow the 
government to withhold basic information on persons detained after the 
terrorist attacks. 25 
The authors believe that Sims was wrongly decided in 1985, but this 
Article intends to show that, right or wrong, Sims is no longer controlling 
precedent when viewed in light of the Intelligence Reform Act. This Article 
asserts that the CIA's ability to deny FOIA requests should be sharply 
circumscribed in accordance with a new information paradigm of maximum 
dissemination as established in the Act. Part I discusses the FOIA, its statutory 
exemptions and its legislative history. Part II examines the Sims decision and 
argues that the Court's ruling contravened Congress's intent to require the 
fullest disclosure possible under the FOIA. Part III summarizes the changes 
established by the Intelligence Reform Act and examines the legislative history 
of the Act to clarify the plain meaning of its text. This Article concludes that 
the Intelligence Reform Act offers a new intelligence information policy that 
recognizes that carte blanche CIA secrecy has been outmoded and 
acknowledges that this nation has experienced a profound shift in terms of what 
24. See, e.g., Arabian Shield Dev. Co. v. CIA, No. 3-98-CV-0624-BD, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2379, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 1999), aff'd per curiam, 208 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 
2000) (rejecting a rival bidder's request for the unclassified records on CIA involvement in 
the award of an oil-production agreement with the former Yemen Arab Republic); 
Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting a 
request for a forty-year-old CIA compilation of the biographies of Cuban leaders); Ctr. for 
Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 
S.Ct. 1041 (2004) (rejecting a request for basic information on persons detained after the 
9/11 attacks); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1993) (withholding information 
concerning the disappearance of a pilot during a flight over Cuba in 1961. The request was 
made by his former wife in 1993.); Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a 
request for information concerning the sabotage of the Greenpeace vessel "Rainbow 
Warrior," which was bombed and sank in a New Zealand harbor in 1985); Fitzgibbon v. 
CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting a request for access to forty-year-old CIA 
records on an alleged plot by Dominican Republic government agents to kidnap President 
John F. Kennedy's daughter Caroline); Rubin v. CIA, 01 Civ. 2274 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19413 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2001) (rejecting a doctoral student's request for 
information on the participation of deceased British poets Stephen Spender and T.S. Eliot in 
a CIA-funded E).lfopean cultural organization); Aftergood ex rei. Fed'n of Am. Scientists v. 
CIA, Civ. No. 98-2107 (TFH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18135 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1999) 
(rejecting a request for the Clinton Administration's budget proposal for CIA intelligence-
related activities in 1999). 
25. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (holding that the government can withhold the 9/11 
detainees' names, their attorneys' names, dates of arrest or release, locations of arrest and 
detention, and reasons for detention). In this case, the Justice Department relied principally 
on Exemption 7, the FOIA exemption for law enforcement records. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) 
(2005). However, the case cited Sims at least eleven times as legal authority to withhold 
information on the detainees that had been obtained or held by the CIA. 
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the public has come to expect to know about what their government is doing in 
their name. 
I. THE FOIA AND OPEN GOVERNMENT 
Government secrecy in matters of American national security has a history 
as old as the nation.Z6 Often, however, the government's need for 
confidentiality in defending the nation and in conducting foreign relations 
conflicts with the democratic principles of an open society and the First 
Amendment rights of citizens to debate important national policy issues.27 CIA 
v. Sims illustrates this clash between the competing democratic values of 
government transparency and the practical needs for government secrecy.28 
The challenge that faced the Sims Court was to resolve the conflict between the 
opposin:§ policy objectives evinced in the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) and the National Security Act.30 This Part discusses the FOIA and its 
legislative history. 
Congress enacted the FOIA in 1966 and has amended it in significant 
respects over the past forty years.31 The FOIA applies to records held by the 
dozens of varied executive branch agencies, such as the Federal Labor 
Relations Authority, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency. It also applies to the cabinet offices, such as the 
departments of State, Defense and Commerce, and includes sub-departments 
such as the FBI. 32 The statute makes these records available to "any person" 
26. See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: 
Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 349-50 
(1986). For example, in the first twenty-nine essays of THE FEDERALIST, the main argument 
for the Constitution, as set forth by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, 
focused on the risks of foreign war and influence. See id. A decade earlier, George 
Washington wrote to one of his secret agents during the War of Independence: "The 
necessity of procuring good intelligence, is apparent and need not be further urged. All that 
remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon 
secrecy, success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are 
generally defeated .... " Sims, 471 U.S. at 172 n.16, (citing Letter from George Washington 
to Colonel Elias Dayton (July 26, 1777), in 8 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 478-79 (J. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933). 
27. See Edgar and Schmidt, supra note 26, at 352. 
28. Sims, 471 U.S. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
29. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (2005). 
30. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343,61 Stat. 495-510 (1947). 
31. The FOIA was amended in 1974, 1976, 1986, and 1996. Freedom of Information 
Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974); Government in the 
Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); and Electronic Freedom of Information Act 
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. l 04-231, ll 0 Stat 3048 (1996). 
32. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & POLICY 
OVERVIEW MAY 28, 2002 [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE]. 
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upon request. 33 A FOIA requester is not required to explain why a record is 
being requested, and the burden is on the government to explain why disclosure 
is refused?4 The FOIA does not apply to records held by state or local 
governments, Congress, the courts, municipal corporations, private individuals, 
private companies, or private entities holding federal contracts.35 
Since its enactment, the FOIA has proved to be a valuable tool for 
informing the public about important issues of public interest and for fillin§ 
gaps in history with previously overlooked or concealed information. 3 
Congress has noted that the FOIA has "led to the disclosure of waste, fraud, 
abuse, and wrongdoing" in the federal government, and the "identification of 
unsafe consumer products, harmful drugs, and serious health hazards."37 
The FOIA creates a judicially enforceable policy that embodies a strong 
presumption "of full agency disclosure"38 grounded in the principle of 
accountability that in a representative democracy, the "public as a whole has a 
right to know what its Government is doing."39 As the Supreme Court observed 
in an early FOIA opinion, "The basic purpose of [the] FOIA is to ensure an 
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to 
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the 
governed. "40 
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2005). See also Sims, 471 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2005). Before the FOIA was signed into law, the public and 
press had no legal remedy when they were denied access to government-held information. 
H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966). The FOIA replaced Section 3 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 
238 (1946). APA Section 3 ostensibly was a public information provision to allow the public 
to gain access to "matters of official record" held by the federal government. S. REP. No. 89-
813, at 4 (1965). But the law was "full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate 
information to the public. Innumerable times it appears that information is withheld only to 
cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities .... " S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3. 
35. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 29-31. 
36. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, §§ 2(a)(3) & (4) (1996). 
37. /d. In recent years, for example, the Philadelphia Inquirer used the FOIA to learn 
that federal citations for pollution law violations plummeted during the early years of the 
George W. Bush administration, dropping thirty-five percent in 2002-2003 compared to the 
previous year. Seth Borenstein, Pollution Citations Plummet Under Bush, THE PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Dec. 9, 2003, at AI. The Dayton Daily News obtained government documents 
under the FOIA disclosing that the government largely ignored sexual assault charges 
brought by women in the military against enlisted men and officers. FOI SERV. CTR., 
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOW TO USE THE FEDERAL FOI ACT 2 
(Rebecca Daugherty ed., 9th ed. 2004). And the San Francisco Chronicle acquired records 
that revealed that during the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI covertly campaigned to fire 
University of California President Clark Kerr and conspired with the CIA director to 
pressure the California Board of Regents to force out liberal professors. Seth Rosenfeld, 
Winning Series Uncovers FBI Secrets Using the FOIA, THE BRECHNER REPORT, 8 (Dec. 
2003). 
38. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3. 
39. /d. at 5. 
40. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). 
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The FOIA's legislative history reflects that Congress was guided by a 
philosophy that linked a policy of full agency disclosure to a democratic 
society.41 A 1965 Senate report, which is widely considered by Congress and 
the Supreme Court as the leading indicator of the FOIA's legislative intent,42 
instructs that: "[a] government by secrecy benefits no one .... It breeds 
mistrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens, and mocks their loyalty."43 In the 
years since the statute was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on 
July 4, 1966,44 Con§ress has repeatedly reiterated this presumption of 
government o,Renness, 5 and the Supreme Court has consistently recognized 
this principle. 6 
Although the FOIA's crafters understood that citizens in a democracy must 
have access to government information in order to make informed decisions,47 
lawmakers also recognized that at times secrecy is necessary for the 
government to function effectively.48 Congress, therefore, created nine 
statutory exemptions that cover certain categories of information that agencies 
may, but are not required to, withhold.49 Congress and the courts have made it 
clear that the exemptions are limited, and outside of these enumerated 
categories, "all citizens have a right to know."50 Lawmakers declared that the 
statute thus provides a "workable formula which encompasses, balances, and 
protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible 
41. See generally S. REP. No. 89-813; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497 (1965). See also Michael 
Hoefges, Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure 
Policy: The "Uses and Effects" Double Standard in Access to Personally Identifiable 
!'!formation in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 9-10 (2003). 
42. In a series of majority opinions, the Supreme Court has cited this 1965 Senate 
report as the primary indicator of the FOIA's legislative purpose. Justice Byron White wrote: 
"Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official 
information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to ... secure such 
information from possibly unwilling official hands." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) 
(citing S. REP. No. 89-813). Justice William J. Brennan wrote that the FOIA's "basic 
purpose reflected 'a general philosophy of full agency disclosure."' Dep't of Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976) (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3). 
43. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 10. 
44. See Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). 
45. See infra notes 53 to 93 and accompanying text. 
46. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofDef. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487,493-94 (1994); U.S. Dep't of 
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989); Robbins 
Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 220; Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-61; Mink, 410 U.S. at 80. 
47. See H. REP. No. 89-1497, at 2-3, 5-6 (1965). 
48. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3. 
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l-9) (2005). The FOIA does not apply to matters that fall under 
the categories of (I) classified information and national security; (2) internal agency 
personnel information; (3) information exempted by statutes; (4) trade secrets and other 
confidential business information; (5) agency memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade 
personal privacy; (7) law enforcement investigation records; (8) reports from regulated 
financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical information. 
50. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 6. 
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disclosure."51 The Supreme Court has noted that the FOIA exemptions are 
strictly limited and "do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, 
is the dominant objective of the Act."52 
Congress strengthened the FOIA in 1974 through several amendments, 
which were prompted in great part by the Watergate scandal during the Richard 
M. Nixon Administration.53 One of the major changes was a substantial 
revision of Exemption 1, the national security exemption, which is the only 
FOIA exemption that allows the executive branch, rather than Congress, to 
determine the criteria for disclosing information. 54 We tum next to an analysis 
of Exemption I, which surfaced as a critical and divisive issue among the 
Court's justices in CIA v. Sims.55 The legislative history of the 1974 
amendments plainly shows that Congress revised Exemption 1 explicitly to 
reiterate its intent to grant public access to federal agency records whenever 
possible--even when national security issues are raised. 56 
A. The National Security Exemption 
Under Exemption 1 's current language, which was crafted in 1974, the 
FOIA does not apply to matters that are both "specifically authorized under 
criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign polic1 and are in fact properly classified pursuant 
to such Executive order . . . . "5 Exemption 1 's original 1966 language said 
only that the FOIA did not apply to matters "specifically required by executive 
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy."58 
The revised language reflects Congress' intention to provide for judicial review 
of purportedly classified documents to confirm that the material does indeed 
fall under the enumerated categories of information that can be classified under 
51. Id.at3. 
52. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361. 
53. Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government: Hearing 
Before the Subcomms. on Administrative Practice and Procedure and Separation of Powers 
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, and the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the 
Comm. on Governmental Operations, 93d Cong. 209-10 (1973) ("Government secrecy 
breeds Government deceit . . . . High government officials sat around in the Attorney 
General's office calmly discussing the commission of bugging and mugging and kidnapping 
and blackmail .... Federal officials who want their activities to remain hidden from public 
view are going to have to tell us why, and their reasons are going to have to be very 
convincing and very specific") (statement ofU.S. Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
54. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(l) (2005). 
55. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 188-90 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
56. See An Act to Amend the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 
Stat. 1561, 1-3 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2005)); H.R. REP. 
No. 93-876, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290. 
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (2005) (emphasis added). 
58. /d. 
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an executive order and to verify that the material was classified according to 
prescribed procedures. 59 
The 1974 amendment's check on mere assertions by the government that 
withheld information was classified came as a direct congressional response to 
a 1973 Supreme Court decision that restricted access to records on national 
security grounds, Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink.60 This case 
concerned a FOIA request by Hawaiian U.S. Representative Patsy Mink, who 
asked the government to release environmental impact statements contained in 
61 
a report on a planned underground nuclear test off the Alaskan coast. The 
government refused to release the documents, arguing that the report was 
classified "top secret," and any material contained in the report was exempt 
from disclosure under Exemption I. 62 Mink brought suit against the 
b . h . 163 government to o tam t e matena . 
In a decisive seven-to-one opinion written by Justice Byron R. White, the 
Supreme Court held that classified documents were exempt from judicial 
review, and the government could meet its Exemption 1 burden simply by 
offering an affidavit that declared that the requested information was 
classified.64 White reasoned that Exemption I 's plain text was ambiguous and 
provided no explicit oversight process to review whether proper procedure was 
used to classify a document.65 He concluded that the national security 
exemption neither permitted nor compelled in camera inspection by judges to 
sort out documents that were not classified. 66 The Mink Court thus held that an 
agency's mere assertion that requested material was classified was sufficient to 
. 'fy d. I 67 JUStl non 1sc osure. 
Congress responded swiftly to the Mink Court's ruling. Declaring that the 
Court had contravened the FOIA's legislative intent,68 lawmakers revised 
Exemption 1. 69 Under Exemption 1 's new language, courts were allowed to 
59. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 12; S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12; 88 Stat. 1561. 
60. Mink, 410 U.S. at 73. 
61. !d. at 75. 
62. !d. 
63. Mink sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to obtain the 
information under the FOIA, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
government. Mink, 410 U.S. at 78. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia reversed the decision, ruling that the national security exemption allowed the 
executive branch to withhold only the portions of the requested documents that were 
classified, not the entire record. The court of appeals directed the lower court to conduct an 
in camera review of the files to determine whether the specific information requested was 
not classified and could be released. !d. 
64. !d. at 84-85. 
65. !d. at 83. 
66. !d. at 81. 
67. !d. at 83-84. 
68. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974). 
69. 88 Stat. at 1561. 
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exercise de novo judicial review, including in camera inspection of documents, 
to look beyond the mere claim that material had been classified and to confirm 
that classification was proper. 70 In other words, the courts can review a 
document to make sure that it was withheld according to the President's 
executive order on Classified National Security Information, which sets out 
both substantive and procedural criteria for withholding national security 
information.71 Substantive criteria enumerate which categories of information 
may be classified, and procedural criteria explain the strict process by which 
national security information is classified. 72 
In addition to establishing judicial review in an Exemption l FOIA case, 73 
the 1974 amendments further strengthened the right to know by requiring all 
agencies to segregate and release nonexempt information from a record that 
contains exempt information. 74 As this Article will demonstrate in the next 
Part, it is significant to note that Congress explicitly intended that the 
segregation-and-disclosure rule applied to Exemption 1. 75 
By amending Exemption 1 to require de novo judicial review, and by 
establishing that the segregation-and-disclosure requirement applies even to 
matters of national security, Congress took its first step to explicitly check 
exclusive CIA authority over whether to release a government record. Two 
years later, Congress for the second time nullified a Supreme Court FOIA 
decision that granted agencies too much discretion over nondisclosure 
decisions. 
70. /d. 
71. See S. REP. No. 93-1200. Presidential classification standards vary from 
administration to administration. See, e.g., George W. Bush Admin. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 
68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003); William J. Clinton Admin. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 
Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995); Ronald Reagan-George H.W. Bush Admin. Exec. Order 
No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R., 166 (1982); Jimmy Carter Admin. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 
190 (1978). [Eds. BB 14.7 says not to include the name of the president who issued the 
order, but including it seems to make sense in this context] 
72. For example, some of the categories mentioned in the current executive order 
include military plans, programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities, foreign 
relations activities and intelligence operations. See George W. Bush Admin. Exec. Order No. 
13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003). Regarding process, only specifically 
designated officials may classify information, and classified information must be marked to 
show the identity of the classification authority, the classification level, and classification 
instructions. /d. 
73. Under Exemption I 's revised language, judicial oversight is still strictly limited. A 
judge cannot challenge the classification standards adopted by a president; a judge can only 
determine whether the information was classified according to its content and proper 
procedure as set forth in an executive order. 
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2005). See also FOIA GUIDE supra note 32, at 122-23. 
75. See Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Krikorian v. U.S. Dep't of State, 984 F.2d 461,466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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B. Congress Restricts Agency Discretion 
In 1976, Congress revised the FOIA again-this time to restrict an 
agency's discretion when an agency invokes Exemption 3 76 as ground for 
nondisclosure.77 Under FOIA Exemption 3, agencies can refuse a FOIA request 
for information if that information is shielded from disclosure under ant other 
federal statutes, including statutes enacted before the FOIA was passed. 8 This 
amendment pertains directly to CIA v. Sims because the CIA refused disclosure 
on the ground that the National Security Act79 qualified as an Exemption 3 
. hh ld" 80 wtt o mg statute. 
In Administrator, FAA v. Robertson,81 a consumer rights group requested 
FAA reports in 1975 on the operations and maintenance performance of 
commercial aircraft. The FAA withheld the information, asserting that Section 
1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 195882 qualified as a withholding statute 
under Exemption 3.83 Section 1104 allowed the administrator broad discretion 
to withhold a requested record when, in the administrator's view, disclosure 
would adversely affect the agency and was not required in the ;mblic interest. 84 
The consumer rights group sued to gain access to the reports. 8 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed decisions by the D.C. District 
Court and the D.C. Circuit Court, both of which had ordered disclosure of the 
reports. Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the Court, upheld the FAA 
Administrator's broad discretion to withhold records, holding that a statute 
need not precisely identify specific categories of data that may be withheld in 
order to qualify as a withholding statute under Exemption 3.86 Justices William 
0. Douglas and William J. Brennan dissented, supporting the lower courts' 
view that Section 1104's discretionary nature and vague ~ublic interest 
standard gave the agency more discretion than the FOIA allows. 7 
76. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(3) (2005). 
77. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, at pt. 1, 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204-
05. See also Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2005); see FOIA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 154. 
79. National Security Act of 1947. 
80. Sims, 471 U.S. 159. 
81. Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975). 
82. 49 u.s.c. § 1504 (1982). 
83. Robertson, 422 U.S. at 265-67 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1504). 
84. Id. at 259. 
85. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled against the government, 
holding that Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act did not qualify as an exempting statute 
under Exemption 3. Robertson v. Butterfield, No. 71-1970 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 1972). The 
D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the discretionary nature of 
Section 1104 and its vague public interest standard were insufficient for it to qualify as a 
specific exempting statute under the meaning of Exemption 3. Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 
F.2d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
86. Administrator, FAA, 422 U.S. at 266-67. 
87. /d. at 268 (Douglas, J., & Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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In response to the Robertson opinion, Congress revised Exemption 3 
explicitly to restrict an agency executive's discretion to withhold information.88 
In its original 1966 language, Exemption 3 said only that the FOIA did not 
apply to matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."89 Congress 
amended this language in 1976 with the addition of a limiting two-part test. 
Under the revised language, the FOIA does not apply to matters that are 
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . , provided that such 
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a 
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular 
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld."90 Echoing the dissenting opinion by Justices Douglas and Brennan, 
lawmakers said they made these changes because the Court's broad 
construction of Exemption 3's 1966 plain text gave too much discretion to 
agency officials and conflicted with Congress's intent to provide as much 
disclosure as possible.91 Congress declared that the Supreme Court's majority 
interpreted Exemption 3 in a way that granted the FAA Administrator "carte 
blanche to withhold any information he pleases."92 
As this Part has shown, the FOIA's strong presumption for disclosure is 
evinced clearly in its plain text and has been reiterated frequently through its 
extensive legislative history.93 This policy stands in sharp relief against the 
objectives ofthe National Security Act of 1947,94 which was the statutory basis 
that the CIA invoked to justify withholding in CIA v. Sims. 95 
88. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. 1, at 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204-
05. 
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1966) (prior to the 1976 amendment). 
90. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(3) (2005). 
91. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. 1, at 23. 
92. !d. 
93. In 1996, the last time Congress amended the FOIA, lawmakers nullified a Ninth 
Circuit Court opinion because, in Congress's judgment, the ruling contravened the FOIA's 
legislative intent to require as much disclosure as possible. In SDC Development Corp. v. 
Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit Court upheld the government's 
right to withhold a computerized database on the ground that electronically recorded and 
stored information does not qualify as "agency record" under the FOIA. The House report 
that accompanied the 1996 amendments (commonly known as the Electronic Freedom of 
Information Act of 1996) rejected the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, emphasizing that 
government-held information in any form, including electronic or computerized formats, is 
subject to the FOIA's disclosure requirements and strong presumption of disclosure. See 
H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3463. 
94. National Security Act of 1947. 
95. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985). 
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II. CIA V. SIMS 
CIA v. Sims concerned a FOIA request for records detailing a series of 
illegal CIA psychological experiments96 conducted in the United States 
between 1953 and 1966.97 This research, code-named "MKULTRA," was 
authorized in an effort to compete with Soviet and Chinese experiments in 
brainwashing and interrogation techniques.98 About eighty private and public 
research facilities-including several major American universities such as 
Stanford, Harvard and Princeton, along with various hospitals and prisons99-
participated in the clandestine project in which unsuspectin~ subjects were 
given then-experimental drugs such as LSD and mescaline. 00 In all, 185 
researchers were involved. In some of the experiments, subjects were picked up 
in bars by prostitutes, given drugs, and then taken for observation to CIA 
safehouses in New York and San Francisco that were equipped with recording 
devices and two-way mirrors. 101 As a result of these and other experiments, at 
least two persons died and others suffered health problems. 102 
Information about these experiments and other questionable CIA activities, 
such as domestic spying during the Vietnam War era, was leaked to the press 
and reported in newspapers; this information prompted Congress to investigate 
CIA operations. 103 Public Citizen, a Ralph Nader organization, filed a FOIA 
request for the CIA's MKUL TRA records, seeking the names of the research 
facilities, the identities of the researchers, and the details of the project's 
96. These CIA psychological tests were an illegal violation of the charter that 
established the Agency. Under the National Security Act, the CIA was specifically denied 
powers of domestic intelligence gathering, specifically, "no police, subpoena, or law 
enforcement powers or internal security functions." Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(d)(l)). 
97. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161-62. 
98. !d. 
99. Also included among the universttles that were identified are Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cornell, and the University of Michigan. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 
84, 85 n.2 (1979). 
100. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161-62. 
101. MARTIN A. LEE AND BRUCE SHLAIN, ACID DREAMS: THE CIA, LSD, AND THE 
SIXTIES REBELLION 32 (1985). 
102. Sims, 471 U.S. at 159-60, 162 n.4; LEE & SHLAIN, supra note 101, at 29-31; See 
also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 89. 
103. News reports that the CIA had engaged in illegal activities and abuses were 
published in 1974 by The New York Times. See, e.g., Seymour Hersh, Huge CIA Operation 
Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 1974, at AI, Al6. The first congressional probe resulted in the Rockefeller 
Commission Report in 1975, which disclosed details of the MKULTRA operation. 
Consequently, Sen. Frank Church was named to head a Senate committee to further 
investigate those and other allegations. Sims v. CIA (Sims/), 642 F.2d 562, 564 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). See also BOB WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF 
WATERGATE42 (1999). 
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research contracts and grants. 104 The CIA disclosed the names of fifty-nine 
research facilities and the terms of the contracts, but refused to name twenty-
one other facilities and kept secret the identities of all the project's 
researchers. 105 
Public Citizen sued to obtain the remaining records, embarking on an 
eight-year-long court fight that ended in 1985 when the Supreme Court ruled 
that the CIA could withhold the information on the ground that the National 
Security Act of 1947106 granted the DCI broad . discretion to protect 
"intelligence sources and methods" from unauthorized disclosure. 107 
A. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion 
CIA v. Sims reached the Supreme Court after the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that an "intelligence source" is defined as 
someone who is promised confidentiality and whose information could not be 
obtained through other means. 108 Under this definition, the CIA would have 
104. Sims, 471 U.S. at 162-64. John Cary Sims was the Public Citizen attorney who 
filed the lawsuit. A second respondent, Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., was director of Public 
Citizen Health Research Group. Id. at 162-63. 
105. Sims, 471 U.S. at 163. It was revealed during the committee hearings headed by 
Sen. Church that, in 1973, CIA Director Richard Helms had ordered all MKULTRA records 
and documents destroyed to avoid their ever being disclosed. However, in a bizarre and 
unexpected revelation, a CIA staff member testified that he discovered about 8000 pages of 
documents that inadvertently escaped destruction. The information sought by Public Citizen 
was contained in these records. Id. at 163 n.5. See also JAMES X. DEMPSEY, The CIA and 
Secrecy, in A CULTURE OF SECRECY: THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO 
KNow 41-42 (Athan G. Theoharis, ed., 1998). 
106. National Security Act of 1947. 
107. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 174-77. 
108. Sims v. CIA (Sims II), 709 F.2d 95, 99-100 (1983). Before reaching the Supreme 
Court, the Sims case was heard by lower courts in Sims v. CIA, 479 F.Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 
1979); Sims v. CIA (Sims I), 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980); and Sims v. CIA (Sims II), 709 
F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
Initially, the D.C. District Court held that the names of institutions and researchers 
could not be withheld because they were not "intelligence sources" within the meaning of 
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947. The district court reasoned that in 
order for the CIA director to declare the researchers to be "intelligence sources," there must 
be "clear, non-discretionary guidelines to test whether an intelligence source is involved in a 
particular case." Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 87-88. 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court held in Sims I that the district court's analysis of 
Section 102(d)(3) lacked a coherent definition of "intelligence sources." The D.C. Circuit 
Court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration based on a definition of 
"intelligence sources" crafted by the appellate court: 
(A)n 'intelligence source' is a person or institution that provides, has provided or 
has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs 
to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to 
obtain without guaranteeing the confidentially of those who provide it. Sims I. 642 
F.2d at 571. 
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been required to release the names of MKUL TRA researchers who did not 
explicitly request confidentiality. Both sides appealed because the Agency 
wanted to withhold all the names in question, whereas Public Citizen wanted 
all the identities disclosed. 
Chief Justice Burger9 writing for the Court majority, framed two principal issues in Sims v. CIA: 10 whether Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security 
Act qualified as a withholding statute under FOIA Exemption 3, 110 and 
whether the MKUL TRA researchers qualified as "intelligence sources" under 
Section I 02( d)(3). 111 
1. The National Security Act 
After World War II, the National Security Act was enacted by Congress to 
reorganize the nation's military and intelligence establishments and to mandate 
changes in foreign policy. 112 The law was approved in the aftermath of harsh 
government and public criticism over the inadequate performance of U.S. 
intelligence operations in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor. 113 A 
1947 Senate report that accompanied the National Security Act pointed to this 
nation's "limited intelligence of the designs and capacities of our enemies" as 
convincing evidence that the United States "would be imperiled were we to 
ignore the cost!?,; lessons of the war and fail to ... prevent the recurrence of 
these defects."1 4 
The National Security Act created the CIA and the National Security 
Council in an effort to improve the nation's ability to gather and analyze 
intelligence information not only during times of war but also during 
peacetime. 115 The CIA was formerly known as the Central Intelligence Group, 
one of a number of small decentralized postwar intelligence groups. 116 The 
National Security Act authorized the CIA to be the exclusive organization for 
On remand, the district court held that the CIA should disclose the identities of 
researchers who did not request confidentiality and ordered the Agency to disclose the 
names of the forty-seven researchers. On a second appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court held in 
Sims II that the district court incorrectly applied the definition of "intelligence sources." The 
D.C. Circuit Court clarified that a researcher could be considered an "intelligence source" 
only if the researcher is promised confidentiality, and the information provided by the 
researcher could not be obtained through other means. Sims II, 709 F.2d at 99-100. After the 
D.C. Circuit Court's Sims II decision, both sides appealed to the Supreme Court. CIA v. 
Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985). 
109. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167. 
110. !d. at 167,177-81. 
Ill. !d. at 167,175-77. 
112. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2-3 (1947); see also H.R. REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3 (1947). 
113. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2-3; see also H.R. REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3. 
114. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2. 
115. See H.R. REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3. 
116. See id. 
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collecting and evaluating foreign intelligence information. 117 
The Sims majority's decision was based principally on a key provision in 
the National Security Act that made the DCI "responsible for protecting 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."118 The 
majority held that this statutory mandate qualified the National Security Act as 
a withholding statute under FOIA Exemption 3. 119 
However, neither the National Security Act's plain text nor its legislative 
history ever defined "intelligence sources" or provided clarifying language for 
this term, thus leading to the second issue identified by the Sims Court: whether 
the MKUL TRA researchers qualified as "intelligence sources" under Section 
1 02( d)(3). In order to resolve this question, the Sims Court needed to settle on a 
definition for "intelligence sources." 
At the outset, the Court majority rejected the D.C. Circuit Court's 
definition of "intelligence sources." Under the appellate court's interpretation 
of Section 102(d)(3), the CIA director is authorized to protect intelligence 
sources from disclosure under the FOIA only if such confidentiality is needed 
to obtain information that could not be acquired by other means. 120 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that this defmition was drawn too narrowly and would 
result in disclosure of more information than should be made public. 121 Had 
Congress intended such a limitation, Burger argued, lawmakers would have 
drafted legislation that narrowed the category of protected sources. 122 In the 
judgment of the Court majority, a narrow interpretation of "intelligence 
sources" ignored the practical necessities of intelligence gathering and the 
unique responsibilities of the Agency: 123 "To keep informed of other nations' 
activities bearing on our national security the Agency must rely on a host of 
sources. At the same time, the Director must have the authority to shield those 
Agency activities and sources from any disclosure that would unnecessarily 
compromise the Agency's efforts."124 
The Court therefore fashioned a new definition: "An intelligence source 
provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its 
statutory obligations .... related to the Agency's intelligence function." 125 
117. National Security Act of 1947: Hearing on H.R. 2319 Before the Comm. on 
Expenditures in the Exec. Dep't, 80th Cong, 5-6 (1947). 
118. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1985) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)). 
119. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167. 
120. !d. at 169. 
121. !d. at 169-70. 
122. !d. at 169. 
123. !d. 
124. Id. 
125. !d. at 177. It is noteworthy that the source for this definition was the CIA itself. 
The original language for the CIA's proposed definition for "intelligence sources" can be 
found in Agency briefs filed with the D.C. Circuit Court in Sims I, 642 F.2d at 576 n.l. 
2006] OF SECRETS AND SPIES 369 
2. Defining the Term 'Intelligence Sources' 
Burger said the Supreme Court's definition of "intelligence sources" 
comports with the National Security Act's plain text and legislative history, 
which suggest a broad authority for the CIA director to protect all sources of 
intelligence information from disclosure. 126 Burger reasoned that the 
government has a compelling interest in protecting not only secret information 
crucial to national security, but also the appearance of confidentiality, which is 
essential to the effective operation of the CIA. 127 The Chief Justice quoted 
Allen W. Dulles, one of the CIA's founders and CIA director from 1953 to 
1961, who said that even sources who freely supply intelligence information 
would "close up like a clam" unless they can count on the government for 
1 fid . 1' 128 compete con 1 entia tty. 
Burger frequently stressed the importance of showing "great deference" to 
Agency discretion, particularly decisions made by the DCI to withhold 
information. 129 Burger wrote that the DCI is granted broad powers specifically 
through Section 1 02( d)(3), 130 and the granting of such power is sound policy 
because the director is the only person familiar with the whole intelligence 
picture. According to Burger, the DCI is the person best suited to determine 
whether individual pieces of information-although not obviously important by 
themselves--can reveal intelligence sources and methods. 131 "The decisions of 
the Director, who must of course be familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges 
are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national 
security interests and potential risks at stake."132 Burger flatly rejected the idea 
that judges should have the power of de novo review in FOIA litigation for 
CIA-held information. 133 Burger asserted that de novo review in CIA cases 
poses inherent dangers because judges have "little or no background in the 
delicate business of intelligence gathering." 134 
To defend the Court's sweeping definition of "intelligence sources" and to 
further bolster the Sims Court's rationale for granting the DCI broad and 
unreviewable authority over disclosure decisions under the FOIA, Burger 
pointed to an amendment to the National Security Act, known as the Central 
Intelligence Agency Information Act of 1984. 135 The amendment's legislative 
history shows that the law was enacted after years of prodding by the Agency, 
126. Sims, 471 U.S. at 169-170, 173. 
127. !d. at 175. 
128. !d. 
129. !d. at 179. 
130. /d.at170. 
131. !d. at 178. 
132. !d. at 179. 
133. !d. at 176. 
134. !d. 
135. !d. at 168 n.11, 174 n.19, citing Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2009 (1984). 
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which wanted Congress to provide additional assurance that CIA sources would 
remain confidentiai. 136 
The 1984 amendment exempted the CIA's "operational files" from 
disclosure under the FOIA. 137 Some examples of information contained in 
operational files include details about organizational structure, numbers of 
personnel assigned to certain functions, and personnel names, titles, and 
salaries. The House report accompanying the amendment described operational 
files as those that consist of "records which, after line-by-line security review, 
almost invariably prove not to be releasable under the FOIA. ... A decade of 
experience has shown that certain specifically identifiable CIA operational 
records systems, containing the most sensitive information directly concerning 
intelligence sources and methods, inevitably contain few, if any, items which 
can be disclosed to FOIA requesters."138 Therefore, these files were shielded 
from disclosure, because the CIA wanted relief from bureaucratic requirements 
to comply with certain FOIA ~equests that the Agency typically rejected. 139 
The CIA Information Act is particularly relevant to this Article's analysis 
because, unlike the National Security Act, the CIA Information Act was 
approved after FOIA's enactment. While Burger focused mainly on a provision 
of the CIA Information Act that enhanced confidentiality by exempting 
"operational files," 140 he ignored key language that actuall(' limits agency 
discretion over all other CIA documents and records. 14 Although the 
amendment exempted CIA "operational files" from disclosure, it also made 
clear that remaining Agency files are subject to the FOIA. 142 The House report 
that accompanied the CIA Information Act clearly stated that one of the 
purposes for exempting operational files was to improve the CIA's ability to 
respond to FOIA requests "in a timely and efficient manner, while preserving 
undiminished the amount of meaningful information releasable to the 
136. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3742. 
137. P.L. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 431); see also H.R. 
REP. No. 98-726, at 4 (House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence). The CIA 
Information Act defines "operational files" as "(1) files of the Directorate of Operations 
which document the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations or 
intelligence or security liaison arrangements of information exchanges with foreign 
governments or their intelligence or security services; (2) files of the Directorate for Science 
and Technology which document the means by which foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems; and (3) files of the 
Office of Security which document investigations conducted to determine the suitability of 
potential foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources." P.L. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 
(1984) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 431). 
138. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4-5. 
139. I d. at 4. 
140. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 168 n.11, 174 n.19 (1985). 
141. See 50 U.S.C. § 431,98 Stat. 2209,2209-2210 (2005). 
142. Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209-2212 (1984). 
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public." 143 The report declared: 
The Agency's acceptance of the obligation under the FOIA to provide information 
to the public not exempted under the FOIA is one of the linchpins of this 
legislation. The [FOIA] has played a vital part in maintaining the American 
people's faith in their government, and particularly in agencies like the CIA that 
must necessarily operate in secrecy. In a free society, a national security agency's 
ability to serve the national interest depends as much on public confidence that its 
powers will not be misused as it does on the confidence of intelligence sources that 
their relationships with the CIA will be protected. 144 
371 
Furthermore, the CIA Information Act of 1984 contained provisions that 
explicitly authorize CIA disclosure obligations under the FOIA. 145 For 
example, the Act states that operational files "shall continue to be subject to 
search and review" for information subject to investigations by Congress, the 
Department of Justice, or other investigatory bodies into improper or unlawful 
activities. 146 Another provision requires that the Agency consult with the 
Archivist of the United States, the Librarian of Congress, and appropriate 
representatives selected by the Archivist in order to conduct periodic and 
systematic reviews of documents for their historical value, their 
declassification, and their release. 147 
Finally, and most importantly, the CIA Information Act reiterates that the 
FOIA establishes that judicial review, including in camera inspection, is 
available to a FOIA requester who alleges that the CIA has withheld a record 
improperly. 148 In fact, Burger's assertion in Sims that de novo review in CIA 
cases poses dangers because judges have "little or no background in the 
delicate business of intelligence gathering"149 directly conflicts with the 
legislative history of the 1974 FOIA amendments, which revised Exemption I. 
The need for de novo judicial review in national security matters was expressed 
forcefully by Representative John Moss of California, widely recognized as the 
driving force behind the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 and a principal 
crafter of the statute's 1974 amendments. 150 Moss argued that judges have the 
capacity to review even sensitive matters of national security. 15 "I do not think 
143. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4. 
144. !d. at 9. 
145. See Pub. L. No. 98-477,98 Stat. 2209-2212 (1984). 
146. 50 U.S.C. § 431,98 Stat. 2209,2209-2210. 
147. 50 U.S.C. § 431,98 Stat. 2210. 
148. !d. 
149. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S 159, 176 (1985). 
150. From 1955 until the FOIA was enacted in 1966, Rep. Moss chaired two 
committees that steered the legislation for the FOIA. The Moss committees, as they were 
called, held 173 hearings and published 17 volumes of transcripts and 14 volumes of reports. 
JOHN T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 6-9 (3d ed. 2000). O'Reilly's book 
is the leading legal practice guide on The Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. 
151. See House and Senate Debate on Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 
1974, House Debate and Vote, Mar. 14, 1974 (Statement by Rep. John Moss), reprinted in 
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we have to make dummies out of [judges] by insisting they accept without 
question an affidavit from some bureaucrat-anxious to protect his decisions 
whether they be good or bad-that a particular document was properly 
classified and should remain secret," Moss said during the House debate on the 
1974 FOIA amendments. "No bureaucrat is going to admit he might have made 
a mistake."152 Moss said it was the intent of Congress in 1966, and again in 
1974, to make it "crystal clear" that the courts must be "free to employ 
whatever means they find necessary to discharge their responsibilities" through 
h . d . . h I "fi d. fi · 153 compre enstve e novo revtew wtt respect to c asst te m ormation. 
B. The Marshall-Brennan Concurrence 
In a strongly worded concurring opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall that 
was joined by Justice William J. Brennan, Marshall disagreed with the majority 
on two important issues. First, he argued that the Court majority's broad 
definition of "intelligence sources" exceeded the plain meaning and legislative 
history of "any congressional act," and that it conflicted directly with the 
FOIA's broad mandate for disclosure. 154 Second, he asserted that the Court 
majority should have ordered the CIA to justify withholding under Exemption 
1 and not under Exemption 3.155 
Marshall said he agreed with the outcome of the majority opinion; the 
definition of "intelligence sources" crafted by the D.C. Circuit Court was too 
narrow and would release more material than should be disclosed in the Sims 
case.
156 He argued, however, that the Sims Court majority went to the other 
extreme, crafting a "sweeping alternative."157 He rejected the majority 
definition of "intelligence source," contending that its overly broad 
construction improperly equates "intelligence source" with the nearly limitless 
term, "information source."158 Under the majority definition, he argued, even 
newspapers, road maps and telephone directories would fall under the Court's 
definition of"intelligence sources," thereby casting an irrebuttable presumption 
of secrecy over an "expansive array of information" held by the CIA, including 
. fi . h . f . 11· I 159 m ormatton t at ts o no mte tgence va ue. . 
According to Marshall, the term "intelligence source" does not have a 
single and readily-apparent definition compelled by the plain language of § 
THE 1974 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 257. 
152. !d. 
!53. !d. at 258. 
154. Sims, 471 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
!55. !d. at 189-90. 
156. !d. at 181-82, 194. 
157. !d. at 182. 
158. !d. at 187. 
159. !d. at 191. 
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102(d)(3), as the majority justices concluded. 160 He argued that the legislative 
history of the National Security Act suggests a congressional intent to protect 
only those individuals who might be harmed or silenced if they were 
identified. 161 "The heart of the issue is whether the term 'intelligence source' 
connotes that which is confidential or clandestine, and the answer is far from 
obvious," Marshall asserted. 162 He offered a compromise definition, which he 
said reflects the statutory language and legislative history of the National 
Security Act, while also falling within the congressionally-imposed limits on 
the CIA's exercise of discretion. 163 He interpreted "intelligence sources" to 
refer only to sources who provide information on either an expressed or implied 
promise of confidentiality. 164 Marshall defended his definition, arguing that it 
would meet the CIA's concerns about confidentiality because it would protect 
not only "intelligence sources" but also protect the kind of information that 
would lead to identifying such a source. 16 
Marshall reserved his harshest criticism for the CIA's "litigation strategy," 
which used ExemRtion 3 instead of Exemption 1 to withhold the requested 
MKULTRA data. 66 Marshall contended that by invoking Exemption 3 to 
withhold the information, the CIA "cleverly evaded" judicial de novo 
review167 -a crucial check created by Congress specifically to limit federal 
agency discretion under the FOIA. 168 Marshall pointed out that Exemption 1 
would have allowed for the same outcome-the withholding of the researchers' 
identities-while at the same time preserving limits on Agency discretion. 169 
Exemption 1 provides two important checks on a federal agency's 
discretion to withhold a record. The first restriction is procedural, in that an 
agency is not the judge of what can be classified; this determination is made by 
each presidential administration under an executive order. 170 Second, the 
judiciary has an important checking role through de novo review. 171 Under the 
power of judicial review in Exemption 1 cases, the courts have the authority to 
confirm that records asserted to be classified were indeed classified according 
160. Id. at 187. 
161. !d. 
162. Id. at 186. 
163. !d. 
164. !d. 
165. I d. 
166. Id. at 184 n.3. 
167. Id. at 190. 
168. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (2005). 
169. Marshall noted that under President Ronald Reagan's executive order on 
classification, in effect at the time, "the Agency need make but a limited showing to a court 
to invoke Exemption 1 for that material." Sims, 471 U.S. at 190 n.6 (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983)). 
170. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A). 
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
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to guidelines established by an executive order. 172 
Marshall argued that the Court should have directed the CIA to withhold 
the MKUL TRA materials under Exemption 1, the national security 
exemption. 173 He said Exemption 1 properly cloaks "classes of information that 
warrant protection, as long as the government proceeds through a publicly-
issued, congressionally-scrutinized and judicially-enforced order."174 He 
characterized the national security exemption as the keystone of a 
congressional system that balances deference to the executive branch's interest 
in maintaining secrecy with continued oversight by the judicial and 
congressional branches of government: 175 "Congress, it is clear, sought to 
assure that the government would not operate behind a veil of secrecx, and it 
narrowly tailored the exceptions to the fundamental goal of disclosure."176 
In permitting the CIA to avoid de novo review, Marshall said the Sims 
majority enabled the CIA to sidestep re¥,uirements carefully crafted by 
Congress to limit the Agency's discretion.1 As a result, the CIA has been 
exempt for the last two decades from releasing virtually any information that 
the CIA Director merely contends may qualify as, or compromise, a source of 
intelligence. 178 Under the sweeping Sims standard, the CIA: 
(1) Need not go through a classification process to withhold 
information. 179 
(2) Can withhold unclassified information, regardless of how dated or 
0 0 b 180 
mnocuous 1t may e. 
(3) Need not assert that a disclosure conceivably could affect national 
security, nor even argue that it could reasonably be expected to cause 
172. !d. "[T]he court shall determine the matter de novo and may examine the contents 
of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall 
be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section." See also 
H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290. 
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b )(I). When the case was first heard by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia, the court held that the names of institutions and researchers could 
not be withheld because they were not "intelligence sources" within the meaning of Section 
102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 87. However, District 
Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, who wrote the opinion, said that the names of the researchers 
could be classified for national security reasons under Exemption 1 to withhold their 
identities. Id. at 88. Oberdorfer indicated his willingness to reconsider the CIA's decision to 
withhold the MKUL TRA information if the Agency refiled and claimed Exemption 1 
protection. Id. at 88. However, the CIA stuck with its Exemption 3 litigation strategy 
throughout the proceedings. 
174. Sims, 471 U.S. at 183 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 182, citing S. REP. No. 89-813, at 10 (1965). 
177. Jd.at189. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 183-84, 190. 
180. Id. at 178 (majority opinion). 
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identifiable damage. 181 
( 4) Is not required to show that an "intelligence source" had requested 
fid . l" 182 con 1 entta tty. 
However 8 the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20041 3 has seriously cast doubt on the viability of Sims. Because the 
new law amended the National Security Act of 1947,184 any questions 
pertaining to access to CIA-held information under the FOIA must now be 
construed in light of the 2004 statute, which is examined in the next Part. 
III. INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT NEGATES SIMS HOLDING 
After years of government hearings and official reports on September 11th, 
Congress enacted the massive 234-page Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004. 185 Among other provisions, the act completely 
overhauled the leadership of the United States intelligence apparatus, 186 largely 
by amending the National Security Act of 1947.187 The "sources and methods" 
language that was construed in Sims appeared in Section 1 02( d)(3) of the 
original National Security Act, 188 which established the CIA and the Director 
of Central Intelligence, who headed both the Agency and, at least nominally, 
the entire intelligence community. This section provided, in pertinent part, that 
"the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for R{otecting 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure .... " 9 
A. Statutory Construction 
That entire section was stricken by Section 1011 of the Intelligence Reform 
Act, which is subtitled "Reorganization and Improvement of Management of 
Intelligence Community."190 The new section completely rewrites Sections 
102-104 of the National Security Act to create a new Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), who, significantly, does not head the CIA, but rather stands 
above it as "head of the intelligence community" and "principal adviser to the 
President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security 
181. /d. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
182. /d. 
183. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
118 Stat. 3638-3872. 
184. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343,61 Stat. 495-510. 
185. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004. 
186. /d. at§§ 1001-1103. 
187. National Security Act of 1947. 
188. /d. at§ 102(d)(3). 
189. !d. 
190. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 1011 (codified at 50 
u.s.c. § 403 (2005)). 
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Council" on intelligence matters. 191 
In language almost identical to the old Section 1 02( d)(3 ), the new Section 
1 02A(i)(l) charges the new DNI to "protect intelligence sources and methods 
from unauthorized disclosure."192 The similarity in language might appear to 
support merely transferring the statutory construction in Sims to any new case 
that might arise: the Supreme Court has certainly held Congress to the Court's 
previous construction of a word or phrase when Congress uses the same word 
hr 0 193 or p ase m a new statute. 
However, several factors grounded in text, context, and public policy 
militate against following that canon in this case. Above all, Congress itself had 
explicitly declined to endorse the Sims interpretation of that language more 
than a decade earlier. 194 In their report accompanying the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993,195 House and Senate conferees 
declined to take any position "with respect to the interpretation of similar 
language in existing law in CIA v. Sims . ... " 196 
Whether there is justification to permit the DCI to withhold information 
concerning intelligence sources and methods which is not classified, in response to 
requests made under the FOIA is a matter that deserves closer, more systematic 
review by the committees of jurisdiction prior to taking further legislative action. 
The conferees believe that this conference report, which addresses organizational 
structure, is not the appropriate vehicle to address this issue. Thus, in enacting 
subsection 103(c)(5) as contained in section 705, the conferees do not intend their 
action to constitute an endorsement of the holding in Sims. 197 
The Supreme Court has held that legislative history explicitly rejecting a 
prior statutory construction of reenacted legislative language is sufficient to put 
that construction to rest. 198 Surely, legislative history refusing to endorse a 
191. 50 U.S.C. § 403(b)(l)-(3) (2005). Indeed, the new DNI is precluded from serving 
as what is now called "the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency."§ 403(c). 
192. 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(l) (2005). 
193. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1917) ("This 
definition of an immoral purpose was given [by the Court] prior to the enactment of the act 
now under consideration, and must be presumed to have been known to Congress when it 
enacted the law here involved."). 
194. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-963, at 88 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2605,2614. 
195. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. I 02-496, 106 
Stat. 3180 (1993). 
196. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-963, at 88 
197. !d. 
198. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 503 (1962). This case concerned 
the 1939 enactment of the tax code, under which meals and lodging in connection with 
medical treatment had been construed by the court as deductible expenses. When Congress 
reenacted the code in 1954, including the language regarding medical deductions, the House 
and Senate committee reports explicitly rejected the meals and lodging deduction. When the 
court faced the issue again in 1962, it held that the legislative history of the new act trumped 
the court's construction of the old one. 
2006] OF SECRETS AND SPIES 377 
prior statutory construction would defeat any argument that Congress 
acquiesced to that construction. 
Although the review suggested by the conferees never took place, both the 
text and legislative history of the new act indicate that Congress created the 
new position ofDNI, not because sensitive information was released too freely, 
but because it was not released freely enough. 199 As then-Senator Bob Graham 
(D-Fla.), former Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a conferee 
on the new legislation, remarked during debate on the conference report, "Our 
intelligence community has developed an unhealthy obsession with secrecy ... 
[which] poses a serious and continuing threat to our national security."200 
This legislation addresses this problem by directing that more rational guidelines 
for intelligence classification be established, and that an independent board be 
empowered to review these decisions. This is an important first step toward 
abandoning this dangerous obsession, and making sure that secrecy decisions are 
made for reasons of national security, rather than because agencies are trying to 
bury their mistakes.201 
Textually, both old and new statutes discuss the dissemination of 
intelligence information within the sections prescribing protection for sources 
and methods. But whereas the old statute merely charges the CIA with 
"appropriate dissemination" of intelligence within the govemment,202 the new 
statute expressly imposes a check on discretion to withhold information by 
requiring the DNI to "maximize the dissemination of intelligence" b~ 
establishing and implementing "guidelines" for the intelligence community? 
Furthermore, these guidelines are to cover not only "classification of 
information," but also "access to and dissemination ofintelligence."204 
Most importantly, the guidelines make more information available by 
providing for the "[p ]reparation of intelligence products in such a way that 
source information is removed to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of 
classification possible or in unclassified form to the extent practicable."205 
Although this provision primarily governs dissemination within the 
government, it is plainly incompatible with the unfettered, case-by-case 
discretion that the Sims Court granted the DCI to determine what information 
might, however indirectly, compromise intelligence sources. If the guidelines 
comply with the mandate of Congress, and the agencies comply with the 
guidelines, unclassified records will necessarily protect those sources. 
Apart from intelligence sources and methods, the operational files of the 
CIA generally constitute the most sensitive records within the Agency. Here, 
199. See infra notes 228-70 and accompanying text. 
200. 150 CONG. REc. Sll939-0l (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004). 
201. /d. 
202. National Security Act of 1947 § l02(d)(3). 
203. 50 U.S.C. § 403-l(i)(2) (2005). 
204. 50 U.S.C. § 403-l(i)(2)(A)-(B). 
205. 50 u.s. c. § 403-l (i)(2)(C). 
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too, the new act limits the Agency's discretion to withhold those records from 
public scrutiny. Under the old National Security Act, as amended by the 
Central Intelligence Agency Information Act in 1984,206 the DCI was 
authorized to exempt his own agency's operational files from disclosure under 
the Freedom of Information Act. 207 The new act now requires the 
"coordination of the Director of National Intelligence" before the Director of 
the CIA may exempt operational files. 208 Few would doubt that most such 
operational files will continue to be exempted,209 but the imposition of a 
second, higher, and more detached approving authority must certainly be read 
as enhancing the possibility of disclosure where appropriate. At the very least, 
it checks the natural tendency of the CIA to issue blanket exemptions for all 
operational records. 
Only one additional paragraph in the original National Security Act of 
1947 pertains to the dissemination of intelligence, and it essentially gave the 
DCI access to national security intelligence held by other government 
departments and a§encies, including, upon written request, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation. 21 The new version, by contrast, contains several independent 
provisions that reinforce the legislative intent that intelligence information be 
shared more freely within the government and even with the private sector. 
Although only one of these specifically concerns the Freedom of Information 
Act,211 the combination strongly suggests that a new frame of reference is 
required of any court considering intelligence-related FOIA requests. 
For example, one provision subtitled "Intelligence Information Sharing" 
requires the DNI to "ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence 
information within the intelligence community consistent with national security 
requirements."212 That provision charges the DNI to "establish policies and 
procedures to resolve conflicts between the need to share intelligence and the 
need to protect intelligence sources and methods."213 Another provision of the 
new act, similarly subtitled "Information Sharing," requires the President to 
create an "Information Sharing Environment" and renames the Information 
206. CIA Information Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-477,98 Stat. 2209 (1984). 
207. Freedom oflnformation Act§ 701(a). 
208. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
§ 1071(a)(6), 118 Stat. 3638-3872. 
209. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 does, however, 
establish a comprehensive regime for judicial review of exemption decisions, § 431 (f), and 
decennial review of all exempted files with a view toward removing the exemptions, § 
43l(g). These provisions are carried over from the CIA Information Act of 1984. See supra 
notes 140-4 7 and accompanying text. 
210. National Security Act of 1947 § 102(e), Ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495-510. Similar, but 
more generous access is provided the DNI at 50 U.S.C. § 403-l(b). 
211. National Security Act of 1947 § 485(b)(2)(A). 
212. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § IOII(g) (codified at 
50 u.s.c. § 403-l(g)(l) (2005)). 
213. /d. 
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Systems Council established b~ rresidential order214 in August 2004 as the 
"Information Sharing Council." 1 Although this provision specifically relates 
to terrorism information, rather than intelligence information generally, it 
reinforces the new policy paradigm by mandating an environment that "allows 
users to share information among agencies, between levels of government, and, 
. . h h . ,216 as appropnate, w1t t e pnvate sector. 
In addition to information sharing, the new act contains several provisions 
designed to protect civil rights and civil liberties, with respect to both 
intelligence and law enforcement functions. These provisions represent a 
further restraint on the agency's proclivity toward secrecy. The Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, for example, must include a Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer to "ensure that protection of civil liberties and privacy is 
appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures developed for and 
implemented by" the intelligence community.217 Moreover, a Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Overs~ht Board must be established within the Executive Office of 
the President.21 Congress explicitly made the board subject to FOIA.219 The 
act further declares that "[it] is the sense of Congress that each executive 
department or agency with law enforcement or antiterrorism functions should 
designate a privacy and civil liberties officer."220 The recognition of the 
protections for civil rights and civil liberties is significant to the extent that 
"civil liberties" encompasses the public's right to know what its government is 
doing. 
The new act also extends the Public Interest Declassification Board for 
another four years, through 2008.221 The Board was authorized in 2000 to 
"promote the fullest possible public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable 
documentary record of significant United States national security decisions and 
... activities ... "by recommending "the identification, collection, and review 
for declassification of information of extraordinary public interest that does not 
undermine the national security of the United States .... "222 The Board's 
powers also are enhanced, particularly with respect to congressional requests 
214. Exec. Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Aug. 27, 2004) (entitled 
"Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans"). 
215. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 1016 (codified at 6 
u.s.c. § 485 (2005)). 
216. 6 U.S.C. § 485(b)(2)(A) (2005). 
217. 50 u.s.c. § 403-3d(b)(l) (2005). 
218. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of.2004 § 1061(b) (For more 
information see the notes contained in 5 U.S.C. § 601). 
219. !d. § 1061(i)(2). 
220. !d. § 1062. The Department of Homeland Security also receives an Officer for 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties under the Act§ 8303 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 345 (2005)). 
221. !d.§ 1102 (t). 
222. Pub. Interest Declassification Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-567, § 703(b)(2)-(3), 114 
Stat. 2856 (2000) (see 50 U.S.C. § 435 note). 
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fi . fi . 223 or m ormation. 
Finally, one cannot leave the text of the Intelligence Reform Act without 
noting the paean to freedom of the press embodied in the act's section on 
"Promotion of Free Media and Other American Values."224 Declaring that 
"[f]reedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental human 
rights,"225 the act establishes as the policy of the United States the "~romotion 
of freedom of the press and freedom of media worldwide .... "22 A cynic 
might look upon this provision as little more than a mechanism for American 
propaganda, but one could be forgiven for thinking that Congress actually 
meant what it said-that these sentiments apply with equal or greater force 
within the United States. Significantly, this provision appears in Title VII of the 
act, titled "9/11 Commission Implementation Act."227 The recommendations of 
that Commission, along with Congress's Joint Panel Report, anchor the new 
act's legislative history, which further supports the assertion that Sims is no 
longer controlling precedent. 
B. The 9/11 Investigations 
The 9/11 Commission Report228 and the Senate and House Joint Panel 
Report229 form the essential factual predicate for the Intelligence Reform 
Act.230 Both of these investigations were harshly critical of the nation's 
intelligence community and found that the terrorist attacks might have been 
thwarted if the spy agencies had done a better job of sharing and publicizing 
some significant information they possessed about the activities of known and 
231 
suspected al-Qaeda members. 
1. The CIA's failed leadership role 
Both reports frequently singled out the CIA in particular for concealing 
information from the public that revealed a string of operational failures and 
223. !d. § 703 (b)(5). 
224. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, § 106l(b), § 7108 
(see 22 U.S.C. § 1431 note). 
225. !d. § 71 08(b )(I )(A). 
226. !d. § 71 08(b )(2)(A). 
227. !d. § 7001. 
228. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2. 
229. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3. 
230. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
118 Stat. 3638-3872. 
231. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 353, 355-56, 400-03; SENATE AND 
HousE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at xvii. See also David Johnston, Report of 
9/11 Panel Cites Lapses by C.I.A. and F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at AI, A13; See 
Dana Priest, Hill's 9/IJ Probe Finds Multiple Failures; White House, CIA Kept Key 
Portions of Report Classified, WASH. POST, July 25,2003, at AI, A16. 
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missteps in the weeks and months before the attacks on New York City and 
Washington, D.C. In examining the roles and responsibilities of the nation's 
respective intelligence agencies, The 9111 Commission Report said that 
"[b]efore 9/11 the CIA was plainly the lead agency confronting al-Qaeda," and 
the Agency had gathered vital information about potential acts of terrorism. 232 
For example, Commission investigators found that for nearly two years before 
the attacks, the CIA had been aware of the terrorist ties of two 9/11 hijackers 
who were living in Southern California.Z33 The Agency had received reports of 
terrorist threats within the United States but did not consider issuing a public 
alert.234 The 9/11 Commission Report also revealed that the CIA had received a 
briefing ~aper entitled "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly" just weeks before the 
attacks? 5 The briefing told of the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was 
taken into custody in Minnesota in mid-August 2001 after his behavior in a 
flight school aroused the suspicions of his flight instructor who contacted local 
authorities. The CIA failed to investigate that information further. 236 
However, as early as December 1998, four months after Usama bin Laden 
ordered the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, former CIA 
Director George J. Tenet issued a memo to several top intelligence officials 
declaring war on the bin Laden terror network.237 "We are at war," Tenet 
wrote. "I want no resources or people spared in this effort. "238 The CIA shared 
some information with a small circle of senior government officials, but the 
imminent dangers £erceived by the Agency and its declaration of war were 
never made public. 39 In other words, the 9/11 Commission concluded, the CIA 
fought this "war" in secret and without the aid of perhaps the nation's most 
powerful weapon-an alerted American ~ublic, fully informed about the grave 
threats posed by bin Laden and al-Qaeda. 40 
The 2003 Joint Panel Report, which was issued a year before The 9/11 
Commission Report, concluded that the CIA-led intelligence community 
possessed enough solid information before the attacks to prompt a "heightened 
sense of alert" and recommend defensive measures such as strengthening 
aviation security, placing suspected terrorists here and abroad on watch lists, 
232. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 400. 
233. See id. at 215-21; SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 
143-52. 
234. See 9/11COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2; at 353-58; SENATE AND HOUSE 
SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 118. See also Priest, supra note 233; Johnston, 
supra note 7. 
235. 9/11COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 347. 
236. !d. at 347. 
237. Tenet resigned June 3, 2004 and left his post on July 11, 2004. He was succeeded 
by Porter Goss, a former U.S. Representative from Florida. 
238. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 357. 
239. !d. at 357. 
240. See id. at 103. 
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coordinating investigation and law enforcement efforts with local and state 
authorities, and alertin¥, the American public to the seriousness and immediacy 
of the potential threat. 41 In strongly worded language, the Joint Panel Report 
noted that the excessive secrecy practiced by the CIA, along with other 
intelligence services, resulted in "missed opportunities" that would have 
"greatly enhanced" the chances of exposing Usama bin Laden's terrorist 
. 242 
consptracy. 
One of the overarching themes that ran consistently and repeatedly 
throughout the 9/11 Commission and Joint Panel reports was that for decades 
the CIA had been able to avoid accountability, not only to Congress, but also to 
the public. The intelligence committees that reported to the Senate and House 
Joint Panel inquiry recommended, for example, that: 
The president should review and consider amendments to the executive orders, 
policies and procedures that govern the national security classification of 
intelligence information, in an effort to expand access to relevant information for 
federal agencies outside the intelligence community, for state and local authorities, 
which are critical to the fight against terrorism, and for the American public.243 
The Joint Panel Report made clear its view that an informed public should 
be a goal of an effective information dissemination policy: "[ t ]he record of this 
Joint Inquiry indicates that, prior to September 11, 2001, the U.S. Intelligence 
Community was involved in fighting a 'war' against Bin Laden largely without 
the benefit of what some would call its most potent weapon in that effort: an 
alert and committed American public."244 
Similarly, the 9111 Commission Report emphasized repeatedly that greater 
oversight and accountability of the nation's intelligence processes are vital to 
help avert future terrorist assaults on American soil. Among the references to 
241. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at XV, 118. 
242. fd. at XV. 
243. Excerpts From Report on Intelligence Actions and the Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2003, at A12, Al3. In its analysis of the report by congressional intelligence 
committees, the New York Times found repeated calls for increased accountability and 
oversight of the nation's spy agencies, especially the CIA. Included among the intelligence 
committees' findings are the following recommendations: "Recognizing the importance of 
intelligence in this nation's struggle against terrorism, Congress should maintain vigorous, 
informed and constructive oversight of the intelligence community"; "[T]he National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States should study and make 
recommendations concerning how Congress may improve its oversight of the intelligence 
community"; Such recommendations should consider "the extent to which classification 
decisions impair congressional oversight"; "Assured standards of accountability are critical 
to developing the personal responsibility, urgency and diligence which our counterterrorism 
responsibility requires"; "[T]he director of central intelligence and the heads of intelligence 
community agencies should require that measures designed to ensure accountability are 
implemented throughout the community"; "[A]s part of the confirmation process for 
intelligence community officials, Congress should require from these officials an affirmative 
commitment to the implementation of strong accountability mechanisms throughout the 
intelligence community." 
244. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 124. 
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the importance of accountability and oversight of intelligence operations, the 
report noted: 
I. "Congress needs dramatic change ... to strengthen oversight and focus 
b"l" ,245 accounta 1 tty. 
2. "[T]he oversight function of Congress has diminished over time .... The 
unglamorous but essential work of [intelligence operations] oversight has been 
neglected, and few members (of Congress) past or present believe it is 
246 performed well." 
3. "Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight 
may be among the most difficult and important."247 
4. "Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is 
now dysfunctional."248 
The 9/11 Commission Report, like the Joint Panel Report, also underscored 
the crucial role that an informed public must play, in connection with effective 
congressional oversight, to hold the CIA and the intelligence community at 
large accountable: "[T]he Intelligence committees [that operate under CIA 
secrecy constraints] cannot take advantage of democracy's best oversight 
mechanism: public disclosure. This makes them significantly different from 
other congressional oversight committees, which are often spurred into action 
by the work of investigative journalists and watchdog organizations."249 
The importance of CIA accountability to the public was also expressed in 
the testimony of several key witnesses before the 9/11 Commission. In his 
testimony before the Commission, Arizona Republican Senator John McCain 
echoed the Joint Panel Report's finding that more access to CIA information 
should be granted not only to Commission and congressional investigators, but 
also to the general public: 
I support the fullest possible public disclosure of all commission hearings and 
findings consistent with existing law and the national security precautions written 
into the enacting legislation. I encourage you to hold public hearings as frequently 
as possible and to publicly issue substantive, interim reports on the Commission's 
progress as envisioned and allowed in the enacted legislation. 250 
The need to have an informed American public actively engaged in the 
discourse about national security was also articulated by former Clinton 
Administration Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in his testimony to the 
9/11 Commission. In considering the various courses of action that could be 
245. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at xvi. 
246. !d. at 105. 
247. !d. at 419. 
248. !d. at 420. 
249. !d. at 103. 
250. John McCain, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the U.S. (May 22, 2003) (available at LexisNexis Congressional Universe, 4 CIS J 89255, at 
3). 
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taken to avert another attack, Cohen testified that it was important to: 
[ d]evelop meaningful, in-depth public discussion-among our citizens and not just 
our elected officials-regarding what compromises on privacy we are willing to 
accept in order to remain safe and free .... We must elevate public discussion on 
these matters, and do our best to remove them from electoral manipulation at least 
until we truly understand the issues and choices.251 
2. The Call for a New Intelligence-Information Paradigm 
The legislative history of the Intelligence Reform Act contains 
considerable evidence to support the notion that a new paradigm must be 
developed for intelligence information dissemination-a modern 21st century 
model that reflects open government and public accountability. 
Indeed, the protracted political wrangling between the Administration and 
9/11 Commission focused nearly entirely on access to information that the 
White House resisted disclosing. The White House had a strained relationship 
with the 9/11 Commission and its chair, former New Jersey Republican 
Governor Thomas H. Kean, ever since Congress created the Commission over 
Bush Administration objections.252 Virtually all of the disputes centered around 
access to CIA-held information. This conflict was not new. In the Joint Panel 
Report released before the 9111 Commission was formed, congressional 
investigators sharply criticized the CIA for "information hoarding."253 For 
example, the Administration, on the recommendation of the CIA, redacted 28 
pages from the nearly 900-page Joint Panel Report. The New York Times later 
reported that the 28 pages focused mainly on Saudi Arabia, the home nation for 
15 of the 19 hijackers, according to people who saw the section?54 Sources 
familiar with the redacted material said the passages were a "searing 
indictment" of how Saudi Arabia's rulers used Islamic charities and other 
organizations as a conduit to distribute millions of dollars to terrorists.255 The 
newspaper said the redactions aroused resentment in Congress, where some 
lawmakers accused the Administration of concealing crucial facts about the 
attacks?56 "I've reviewed the 28 pages twice, and my judgment is that 90 to 95 
percent could be released and not compromise our intelligence in any way," 
251. William S. Cohen, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the U.S. (Mar. 23, 2004) (available at LexisNexis Congressional Universe, 4 CIS J 
892137, at 24). 
252. Philip Shenon, Bush Agrees to Answer All Of 9/11 Panel's Questions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at Al4. 
253. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
254. David Johnston, Classified Section of Sept. 11 Report Faults Saudi Rulers, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 26, 2003, at Al. 
255. !d. 
256. !d. 
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said Alabama Republican Senator Richard C. Shelby.257 
Eventually, after several confrontations between the White House and 
Kean, most of the contested information was made available to the 9/11 
Commission.258 In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, McCain 
deplored the Administration's information-withholding practices for "creating 
the appearance of bureaucratic stonewalling.',259 For example, McCain 
criticized the Administration for withholding from the 9/11 Commission some 
information that had previously been gathered by the intelligence committees 
that reported to the Senate and House Joint Panel. McCain recounted one 
incident in which U.S. Representative Tim Roemer, who had served on the 
Joint Panel investigation, was later denied access to material contained in the 
Joint Panel Report after Roemer, an Indiana Democrat, was appointed to the 
9/11 Commission. Eventually, the Administration complied with Roemer's 
request. "I find it particularly troubling," McCain testified, "that Commission 
member and former Congressman Tim Roemer, who helped write the 
congressional report as a member of the House Intelligence Committee, was 
until this month denied access to his committee's own product."260 
The findings of the Congressional Joint Panel Report and the 9/11 
Commission Report, combined with the history of the troubled relationship 
between 9/11 investigators on the one side and the Administration and CIA on 
the other side, reveal the true nature of the core struggle: Who is to control 
government-held information on issues of vital public concern, including 
questions of national defense? The fact that this struggle is even taking place 
reflects the emergence of a growing movement to effect change and to move 
away from the kind of outdated model evinced in The National Security Act of 
1947261 and the Supreme Court's rationale in CIA v. Sims. 262 The developing 
model seems to be one that is firmly grounded in the accountability principles 
of democracy in an open society--even when it comes to intelligence matters. 
According to the Joint Panel Report, the intelligence community must 
"overcome bureaucratic information-hoarding" and "take decisive steps to 
reexamine the fundamental intellectual assumptions that have guided the IC's 
[Intelligence Community's] approach to managing national security 
information."263 Specifically, the report noted that it may become necessary to 
"create a new paradigm wherein 'ownership of information,' did not belong to 
257. Editorial, Credible Classifications, WASH. POST, July 13,2004, at Al4. 
258. Shenon, supra note 252. 
259. John McCain, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the U.S., Second Public Hearing (May 22, 2003) (available at LexisNexis Congressional 
Universe, 4 CIS J 89255, at 2). 
260. /d. 
261. Pub: L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (2005)). 
262. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985). 
263. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECTCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
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the collectors."264 This idea of creating a new paradigm for intelligence 
information dissemination is reiterated throughout the Joint Panel's analysis: 
[l]t becomes clear that the sort of sophisticated pattern-analysis and semi- or fully-
automated "data-mining" capabilities that will be necessary for intelligence 
analysis to keep up with complex transnational threats such as those presented by 
Usama bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida organization are not compatible with traditional 
notions of inter-Intelligence Community secrecy and restrictions upon access 
based upon an outsider's "need to know" as determined by the agency 
information-holders themselves.265 
This emerging belief that current intelligence information-dissemination 
systems are outmoded and no longer effective was also expressed by former 
Clinton Administration Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright in her 9/11 
Commission testimony.266 Albright said that the practices of excessive secrecy 
and habitual withholding of government-held intelligence-related information 
were routine and even appropriate during the Cold War when the government 
cloaked all of its intelligence information: 
except from those with a very specific need to know .... The dissemination of 
information was controlled by the originating agency. And clear separations were 
maintained between public and private, domestic and international, law 
enforcement and intelligence .... The old system was appropriate for the times but 
the times have changed.267 
Finally, the matter of CIA mistakes and misjudgments in connection with 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq bears mentioning in this analysis because these lapses 
also demonstrate how excessive secrecy has undermined Agency effectiveness 
and good management. In a unanimous report released in July 2004, the Senate 
Intelligence Committee concluded after its investigation that CIA assessments 
of Iraqi weapons strength-particularly chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons of mass destruction-were overstated or unfounded. 268 The 511-page 
report described the Agency as a broken and dysfunctional corporate culture 
suffering from poor management:269 "In the end, what the President and the 
Congress used to send the country to war was information provided by the 
intelligence community, and that information was flawed."270 
264. Id. at 7. 
265. Id. at 33. 
266. Madeleine K. Albright, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the U.S. (Mar. 23, 2004) (available at LexisNexis Congressional Universe, 4 
CIS J 892134, at 21 ). 
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268. See PREWAR INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 23. See also Douglas Jehl, 
Senators Assail C.I.A. Judgments on Iraq's Arms as Deeply Flawed, N.Y. TiMES, July 10, 
2004, at AI; Dana Priest, supra note 231, at AI. 
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CONCLUSION 
The government's need to protect confidential sources is an inherent aspect 
of effective intelligence operations. However, the Court majority in CIA v. 
S. 271 th "" 11" " . h f 1ms equates e term mte 1gence sources w1t any source o 
information,272 thus creating an irrebuttable presumption of secrecy over a vast 
array of CIA-held materials, including information that is of questionable 
. 11" 1 273 mte 1gence va ue. 
In so ruling, as Justice Marshall pointed out,274 the Court contravened the 
plain text and legislative intent of the FOIA.275 As this Article has shown, the 
Sims majority discounted the FOIA's extensive legislative history, including 
the seminal 1965 Senate report that accompanied the originallegislation,276 and 
the 1974277 and 1976278 amendments, which reflected Congress's intent to 
require as much disclosure as possible, even in matters of national securif1c. 
Additionally, the Court's selective reading of the 1984 CIA Information Act2 9 
is an exercise in historical revisionism; the Court majority completely ignored 
key provisions in the Act that made clear that the FOIA's disclosure rules apply 
to all materials that fall outside the narrowly defined category of "operational 
files."280 In effect, the Supreme Court replaced Congress's policy judgments 
with those of the Sims majority. 
As a result, the CIA has been able to shroud itself in secrecy and insulate 
itself from the twin spurs of public criticism and public accountability, 
undermining not only Agency effectiveness but also the public's trust in 
government. CIA failures surrounding the 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq illustrate that the deference to secrecy that the Court read into 
the National Security Act of 1947281 is no longer warranted, if it ever was, as 
congressional lawmakers strongly suggested when they refused to endorse the 
Sims decision in the 1993 Intelligence Authorization Act. 282 
The old paradigm-which is grounded in the belief that carte blanche 
secrecy in matters of intelligence and national security automatically outweighs 
the public benefits of disclosure--does not reflect the culture of post-Cold War 
271. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985). 
272. !d. at 187 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
273. !d. at 191. 
274. !d. at 182. 
275. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (2005). 
276. S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965). 
277. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974). 
278. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). 
279. Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2009 (1984). 
280. See supra note 137. 
281. National Security Act of 1947, Ch. 343,61 Stat. 495-510. 
282. Pub. L. No. I 02-496, I 06 Stat. 3180. 
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and post-9/11 Arnerica.283 Echoing former Secretary of State Albright, who 
called for reforming intelligence information policy, the nonpartisan 9/ll 
Commission concluded: "[T]he national security institutions of the U.S. 
government are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold War. The 
United States confronts a very different world today."284 
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that Congess devise a fresh 
model of governmental management in this new era.2 The Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,286 which adopted many of the 
9/11 Commission's findings, recognizes how unchecked secrecy can conceal 
serious problems in Agency management and also understands that an informed 
public must perform an important function in any system created to ensure 
effective congressional oversight of the intelligence services.Z87 Specific 
features of the Act-its provisions for the broadest possible dissemination of 
. 11· . .c . 288 d .c nh d d I .fi . d 289 . mte 1gence m1ormat1on an 10r e ance ec ass1 1cat1on proce ures, 1ts 
respect for civil rights and civil liberties, 290 and even its promotion of press 
freedom291-Ieave little doubt that the information-dissemination policy 
paradigm has changed and Sims is no longer a viable statutory construction 
under the FOIA. 292 
With Sims removed as an obstacle to disclosure, it is now possible to revisit 
what Congress actually intended for the courts to do when it comes to handling 
FOIA requests for CIA-held information. We propose a two-~art approach. 
First, the CIA should no longer be allowed to use Exemption 3 93 to sidestep 
Exemption 1 's provisions requiring de novo judicial review of classified 
information and mandating the segregation and release of unclassified material 
. d . I .fi d d 294 Th . I . · contame m a c ass1 1e ocument. e natlona secunty exemptiOn 
represents a carefully crafted check on Agency discretion that balances 
deference to intelligence secrecy concerns with judicial oversight. Second, 
when the question of defining an "intelligence source" arises, as it certainly 
will, the courts should adopt a definition that provides a nondiscretionary test to 
clarify whether a source of information is an "intelligence source" and 
deserving of confidentiality. For such a definition, the test crafted by Justice 
283. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 399. 
284. !d. 
285. !d. at 406. 
286. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
118 Stat. 3638-3872. 
287. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 103. 
288. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. 
292. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2005). 
293. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 
294. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(1). 
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Marshall still has merit today. Under this standard, confidentiality would 
extend to "intelligence sources" who provide information on either an explicit 
or implicit promise of confidentiality, or who would be harmed or silenced if 
identified. Further, confidentiality also would be extended to information that 
could reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of an intelligence 
295 
source. 
We understand that if the courts were to adopt this approach, obstacles to 
access would still persist. Classification criteria are determined by the 
President, and these standards vary with each administration. Also, the 
executive branch agencies historically have overused the "classified" stamp, 
. f " " d 296 H h . creatmg vast storerooms o secret ocuments. owever, t e senous 
problem of overclassification, which must be resolved as well, is a distinctly 
separate issue and beyond the scope of this Article. 
This Article's proposal for court treatment of CIA nondisclosure decisions 
offers a significant step toward protecting legitimate "intelligence sources" 
while also providing for more government transparency and greater access to 
the kind of intelligence information necessary for meaningful public discourse 
on the vital policy questions facing this nation. 
295. Sims, 471 U.S. at 193-94 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
296. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) ("[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system 
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those 
intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a 
truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, 
recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.") 
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